and criminals into Japan, was consistent with developments in other industrial democracies to control their foreign populations following the 11 September 2001 attacks. The new immigration controls are modeled after the U.S.-Visit (United States Visitor and Immigration Status Indicator Technology) Program that was implemented in 2004 to collect and store biometric information on foreigners entering the United States. The anomaly in Japan's case, however, was that the bill exempted one particular group of foreigners: "special permanent residents," the vast majority of whom are prewar Korean immigrants and their descendants.
Lim Young-Ki (Im Yong-ki), a third-generation Korean resident born and raised in Japan and vice president of the Korean Youth Association in Japan, was making plans for a Korean festival when he received an urgent call at Mindan headquarters from an Amnesty International representative in November 2007.
1 The rally to protest the reinstatement of the fingerprinting requirement was scheduled to be held on Tuesday, but not a single Korean organization or activist had made the commitment to show up. In contrast to the decadelong antifingerprinting movement led by Korean activists in the 1980s, which ultimately led to its abolishment for special permanent residents in 1993 and for all foreign residents in 1999, the Korean response to its reinstatement was curiously weak. Although various Korean organizations issued public statements opposing the bill, Korean residents were noticeably absent among the foreign residents and activists who organized protests against the bill. Lim, who was only a teenager when the fingerprinting requirement for Korean residents had been abolished in 1993 and, thus, had never been fingerprinted, understood the symbolic significance of Korean participation in the newly mobilized antifingerprinting movement. Most of his senpai (older colleagues) in Mindan felt that the Korean community did not have a stake in the current antifingerprinting movement because the bill explicitly exempted the Korean-resident community. Lim, however, saw the invitation to participate as an Introduction 3 opportunity to shift the direction of his political activities in order to reach out to a broader community of foreign residents.
The representative from Amnesty International asked Lim if there was something from the 1980s movement that could be used in the rally. Lim recalled that Mindan headquarters housed the original giant thumbprint balloon used in various antifingerprinting movements during the 1980s, as displayed on the cover of this book. Although inflating the giant balloon would normally require work over an entire week, Lim, with the help of other members of his organization, managed to inflate the balloon in a single day and bring it to the rally. Despite his valiant efforts to demonstrate Korean solidarity with the protestors, Lim estimates that less than two hundred people were present with only a smattering of Korean activists. In contrast, a rally organized by Korean activists the following spring to demand local voting rights for foreign residents brought together nearly six hundred Korean and other foreign residents. When I asked another Korean activist why he and others did not join the renewed antifingerprinting movement, he replied, "It would have been better if more Korean residents supported the protests. But it is not as important as other issues like local voting rights. Anyway, the Japanese government was not stupid enough to include Korean residents [when it reinstated the fingerprinting requirement]. There would have been hell to pay if it did" (interview, 7 September 2008, Osaka).
Lim's story highlights a defining feature of contemporary immigration and citizenship politics in Japan. Japan is the only advanced industrial democracy with a fourth-generation immigrant problem. While other industrialized countries face the challenges of incorporating postwar immigrants, Japan struggles with the repercussions of its failure to incorporate prewar immigrants and their descendants. With the recent influx of new immigrants to Japan, the country's already fragmented, incoherent policies and practices regarding its foreign population developed into a world of extremes. The official stance toward immigrants suggests that non-Japanese do not have the capacity to become Japanese and, therefore, should be excluded. Meanwhile, some Japanese officials have publicly promoted the naturalization of Korean residents throughout the past two decades, arguing that they are de facto Japanese. Although immigration policies seek to uphold the commonly accepted idea that Japan is not a country of immigration, local officials and citizens have created immigrant integration programs based on the notion that foreign residents are local citizens. Public debate on immigration has hinged on either opening (kaikoku) or closing (sakoku) Japan's borders. Whereas permanent foreign residents have rights that are almost on par with Japanese citizens, permanent-residency status remains elusive for many recent immigrants to Japan. Despite Japan's official closed-door policy, record numbers of immigrants have entered the country as laborers, students, and, to a lesser extent, refugees. Between 1985 and 2008, the total foreign population more than doubled from about 850,000 to more than 2.2 million (see Table I .1). Although recent immigrants to Japan come from more than 190 countries on every continent in the world, the majority are laborers from other Asian countries including China, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand. The Brazilian and Peruvian immigrant population also experienced phenomenal growth after the enactment of state-sponsored recruitment of Nikkei workers into the labor market. Finally, there were also an estimated 150,000 immigrants who overstayed their visas or entered Japan illegally in 2008.
The recent wave of immigrants arrived in Japan on the heels of a noncitizen civil rights movement led by prewar Korean immigrants and their descendants. As large numbers of new immigrants became established in their local communities, they found themselves in the middle of the movement's final stages, which have focused on securing local voting rights for foreign residents. In this context, in which the foreign population in Japan encompassed recently arrived immigrants as well as multigenerational permanent residents, foreign-resident claims in the 1990s ranged from proposals for alien suffrage to demands for multicultural education to appeals to gain special permission to stay in Japan among visa overstayers. Japan in the 1990s lacked national immigrant incorporation programs to provide recent immigrants with Japanese-language instruction, information about housing and schools, and other essential skills needed for settlement in Japan; at the same time, many foreign residents could, in principle, exercise many of the same rights as Japanese nationals. On the one hand, this gap has placed a significant burden on local governments that must meet the demands of an increasingly diverse community with insufficient support and guidance from the national government. As of 1 January 2008, there were also an estimated 150,000 illegal immigrants in Japan.
On the other hand, the particular timing of recent immigration to Japan vis-à-vis developments in the Korean civil rights movement has had a profound effect on the ways in which proimmigrant organizations have mobilized foreign residents and how foreign residents, including new immigrants as well as multigenerational residents, are discussed in the public sphere. Rather than focus solely on the immediate needs of new immigrants, numerous advocacy groups, local government offices, and mainstream civil-society organizations put emphasis on the idea that foreign residents are citizens, linking their active engagement in the community with democratic revitalization. This book seeks to explain the contradictions between policies that exclude foreigners and policies and practices aimed at incorporating foreign residents in contemporary Japan. Based on fieldwork conducted in Tokyo, Kawasaki, and Osaka and in-depth interviews with individual foreign residents, community activists, Japanese policy makers, journalists, and academics from 1998 to 2008, this book examines how traditionally underrepresented actors in Japan negotiate national policies and ideologies in their attempts to bring about social change. The inconsistencies of Japan's immigration and citizenship politics have created a delicate dilemma for Japanese authorities. Because permanent residents have social rights on par with Japanese citizens, officials have a strong incentive to keep permanent-residency status exclusive and maintain the official stance that discourages immigrant permanent settlement. At the same time, the unavoidable, continuing growth of the foreign population has pressured the government to politically assimilate the population of foreigners with the most privileged status in Japan: special permanent residents, the vast majority of whom are prewar Korean immigrants and their descendants. Koreanresident activists, in turn, have persistently contested the conditions of the community's political incorporation and have sought to diversify the meaning of Japanese citizenship from a discourse based on cultural homogeneity to one based on a multicultural, multiethnic society. In this way, Japan's stringent citizenship policies have unintentionally provided Korean residents with unprecedented bargaining power and specific opportunities for negotiating the terms of their political incorporation.
Recent scholarship by a new generation of Japan specialists analyzes how state and social actors have negotiated international norms, democratic ideals, and local pressures in an increasingly unstable social, . Unlike much of the earlier literature that questioned whether Japan is a democracy, these works ask why certain actors are able to influence public debate and successfully advance democratic reforms and why others fail at specific historical junctures. In particular, the events of the last two decades -including the economic recession, increasing voter discontent, large-scale immigration, and the looming demographic crisis -have led to significant shifts in Japan's political and social landscape for traditionally underrepresented social actors. Building on this scholarship, this book aims to further our understanding of democratic inclusion in Japan by analyzing how those who are formally excluded from the political process voice their interests and what factors contribute to the effective representation of those interests in public debate and policy. As Japan grapples with the issues of immigration, multiculturalism, and national identity, the political incorporation of the foreign community has important implications for understanding the quality of democracy in contemporary Japan.
This book is also about the dilemmas that Japan shares with other democracies in accommodating diversity. The recent wave of immigration to industrialized societies has placed the question of immigrant incorporation at the center of scholarship on immigration and citizenship. Although the problem of immigrant incorporation encompasses a variety of issues, such as cultural, linguistic, religious, and educational concerns, scholars as well as policy makers have given particular attention to the issue of political incorporation and political participation in recent years because of what many have identified as a troubling trend among the current wave of immigrants. That is, foreign communities are growing in size; at the same time, many immigrants and their descendants remain politically unincorporated. Scholarship on immigrant incorporation tends to focus on the role of structural, statelevel variables or on individual-level variables to explain this paradox. In contrast, this book analyzes contextual factors and intermediate organizations in order to identify the unintended consequences of immigrant incorporation regimes and the political opportunities for noncitizens to engage in the polity.
The portrayal of immigrant incorporation as a two-way relationship between the state and immigrants does not reflect on-the-ground practices in which intermediary organizations and civil-society groups www.cambridge.org © in this web service Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-51404-0 -Immigration and Citizenship in Japan Erin Aeran Chung Excerpt More information play central roles in shaping paths for immigrant political empowerment. Immigration and immigrant policy outcomes often do not reflect their objectives. States are then forced to revise their policies and, in cases in which international and domestic actors -including immigrant groups -exert pressure on the state, enact significant reforms. These revisions and reforms further institutionalize the limits and possibilities of immigrant politics by expanding (or constricting) alien rights, stabilizing (or destabilizing) foreign legal status, and shaping incentives for political engagement that can affirm or contest the official model of immigrant incorporation.
Intermediary organizations -in the forms of local state and nonstate institutions as well as mainstream and coethnic civil-society organizations -shape the political learning environment for immigrants and the paths for their political engagement in three central ways. First, prior activism by immigrant advocacy groups establishes the blueprint for subsequent movements by demonstrating the strengths and weaknesses of specific political strategies, such as lobbying, litigation, and protests, and by prioritizing the issues concerning immigrant communities. Established advocacy groups, furthermore, create networks of central actors who continue to play important roles in subsequent movements. These groups are also often the "training ground" for future generations of immigrant activists. Second, immigrant advocacy groups and local institutions provide resources that influence the direction of immigrant political engagement. Mainstream and coethnic civil-society organizations, for example, often provide immigrants with consultation services that shape the ways in which immigrants act on their grievances. Advocacy organizations can play a pivotal role in an immigrant's decision to either privatize social conflict -through prayer or mediation, for instance -or make public claims in the courts or on the streets. Likewise, state and nonstate institutions may influence an immigrant's decision to naturalize by providing information and assistance in the naturalization process, or they may encourage immigrants to voice their interests specifically as foreign residents through the establishment of foreign-resident assemblies and councils. Finally, the ideas that emerge out of early immigrant advocacy shape the ways that subsequent generations of immigrants, civil-society actors, and, at times, state officials approach immigrant political empowerment. These ideas form the basis for an immigrant group's collective identity,
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including the ways that they represent themselves in the public sphere, as immigrants, hyphenated minorities, or foreign-resident citizens, for example, and may set the agenda for immigrant claims making as well as state policies regarding immigrants. Accordingly, by examining the interactive relationship between state policies, intermediary organizations, and immigrant groups, this book aims to provide insights into the gaps among immigrant policy intent, interpretation, and outcomes.
the problem of immigrant incorporation
Although the Japan case is unique in some ways, it is also emblematic of most immigrant incorporation regimes in contemporary democracies. None have actually resolved the so-called immigrant incorporation problem, which is evident in low naturalization rates, vast economic disparities, and racial and ethnic tensions. Given the history of Germany's restrictive citizenship policies until the implementation of major reforms in 2000, it should not come as a surprise that foreign residents in Germany have exhibited low rates of naturalization. Five years after the 2000 reform, the rate of naturalization in Germany was less than 2 percent of the total foreign population (SOPEMI 2007) . Even in Britain, however, where immigrants are seemingly well integrated politically, immigrants and minorities engaged in violent forms of protest as often and sometimes even more than those in Germany between 1990 and 1995 (Koopmans and Statham 2000 . Similarly, Jane Junn's (1999) study of racial minority political participation in the United States found that protesting was the only pattern of political activity in which racial minority groups outpaced whites. Although many have heralded the Swedish system of immigrant incorporation as an ideal model of multiculturalism, those with an immigrant background -regardless of nationality -are most at risk of unemployment and least likely to engage in active citizenship (Soininen 1999) .
Scholars of immigration commonly describe immigrant incorporation as a necessary process for social and political stability. First, there is the real and imagined connection between the alien and the subversive. We generally assume that the more integrated the immigrant, the less likely that he or she will commit an act that threatens national security and public tranquillity (despite evidence that contradicts this assumption). Second, the rapid influx of immigrants from www.cambridge.org © in this web service Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-51404-0 -Immigration and Citizenship in Japan Erin Aeran Chung Excerpt More information diverse ethnocultural backgrounds can be perceived as a potential threat to notions of a stable national identity and way of life (Rudolph 2003; Weiner 1993) . Public resentment based on this perception is reflected in discriminatory policies and practices toward immigrants, community tensions, and violence. Likewise, the effects of political and social marginalization on the immigrant population -in areas such as education, employment, criminal justice, legal rights, health, living conditions, and civic participation -are potentially destabilizing for the receiving society. Finally, for putatively democratic states, the long-term exclusion of a significant fraction of the population from the rights and duties of full citizenship is untenable. The contradictions inherent in having a population of permanent residents who pay taxes, benefit from social services, and otherwise participate in the host civil society but remain disenfranchised threaten the political stability of liberal democracies.
The concept of immigrant incorporation has undergone significant changes in the scholarship on immigration and citizenship. Straightline assimilation theory in early twentieth-century U.S. social scientific scholarship assumed that immigrant assimilation into the dominant society was inevitable. The current conception of incorporation implies a mutually constitutive relationship between the immigrant and the receiving society. Although immigrants adapt to the receiving societies, they also have a significant impact through a type of give-andtake process that ultimately results in the remaking of the immigrants and the receiving societies (DeWind and Kasinitz 1997: 1098) . Rather than complete absorption, then, incorporation as it is used in the contemporary sense refers to a process of "becoming similar," "or treating as similar" (Brubaker 2001: 534) . Hence, the emphasis is on mutual acceptance and inclusion.
The failure of immigrant incorporation in contemporary democracies, however, suggests that this interactive model of immigrant incorporation has yet to emerge in practice. The French republican model of immigrant incorporation is contingent on a type of ethnic privatization that requires immigrants and their descendants to contain, sanitize, and, at times, neutralize their differences in the public sphere in a type of "color-blind integration" (Bleich 2001 (Bleich , 2003 . Although the model's stated aim is to assimilate immigrants into a nationally
